Geneva – A Test of U.S. Action in the Face of the Logic of Iranian Diplomacy – This was written on the social network X by the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Georgia, Seyed Ali Mojani.
“Today in Geneva, the most important issue is the action of the United States. It was they who called for the resumption of dialogue. This dialogue was previously halted due to their own actions and attacks. Nevertheless, even this request itself constitutes a kind of practical step, though it is not sufficient.
Iran’s position is clear. In negotiations with the United States, we have not discussed ‘Iran,’ nor will we do so in the future. Our dialogue concerns only the nuclear issue. It is the responsibility of diplomacy to conduct nuclear negotiations aimed at lifting sanctions, while it is the responsibility of the defensive structures of the Islamic Republic of Iran to remain constantly prepared to repel threats. Accordingly, these two issues are separate.
Both the diplomatic and defensive structures have demonstrated that they effectively and in coordination carry out their missions. Iran’s twelve-day defensive war in 2025, directed against the aggression of foreign powers, clearly confirmed this reality.
Therefore, it would be a serious mistake for anyone to once again make an incorrect strategic calculation and attempt to test what has already been tested. The real effectiveness of negotiation outcomes is far more important than their form, location, or timing.
The negotiation mechanism has remained continuously active for Iran in recent years. Our negotiators are like drivers who possess the proper licenses and competence: they have the authority to make decisions and act accordingly; they know the road well and understand the risks of deviating from the course. The problem is that the other side constantly ‘turns off the negotiation vehicle’ and primarily thinks about whether it can change the route. This is the greatest mistake in the negotiation process.
If anyone decides to negotiate over Iran’s defensive capabilities, such ‘negotiation’ would fundamentally differ from diplomatic dialogue. It would receive the same type of response as occurred during Iran’s twelve-day defense in the summer of 2025; however, this time its scale and scope would be far broader and stronger than previously witnessed. This is a catastrophic choice, one that Iran does not wish to initiate.
In today’s Geneva negotiations, the necessary competence for decision-making exists. Moreover, Iran’s comprehensive proposals are attractive and effective and can serve as a guiding foundation for agreement. Nevertheless, if a decision is made to move toward an agreement through short but consistent steps, with the presentation of necessary guarantees, this gradual approach may also assist the process in managing the conflict and preventing a major catastrophe for the region and the world,” Mojani writes.

